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JAKE SPRATT*
Abstract: This Article proposes an economic framework
with which to analyze the U.S.'s electronic privacy laws in
the context of international privacy standards. A key
assumption is that electronic privacy generally exists in
tension with the speed and convenience of e-commerce: if
privacy protections are too strong, e-commerce will suffer.
At the same time, however, this Article shows that
consumers expect a certain basic level of privacy when they
conduct electronic transactions. A government that fails to
provide this certain level of privacy effectively weakens the
e-commerce industry. This Article concludes the United
States has failed to guarantee sufficient privacy protections
and that, by learning from the E.U. and Canada, the U.S.
can increase both personal privacy and the effectiveness of
e-commerce by enacting comprehensive electronic privacy
laws.
INTRODUCTION
The technological revolution and the emergence of mass
communications have irreversibly changed the face of personal
privacy. Although traditional threats to privacy still exist, such as
involuntary disclosure of personal information in newsprint, "our
privacy is peculiarly menaced by the evolution of modern society, with
its burgeoning technologies of surveillance and inquiry."' There is no
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1 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004).
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greater example of these "burgeoning technologies" than the World
Wide Web, which enables tens of millions of people across the world
to freely exchange massive amounts of information almost instantly.2
While this incredible advancement has enabled explosive economic
growth, the technology has not come without a price.
The Internet's rapid growth in scale, scope, and usage has led to a
dramatic increase in the number of public disclosures of personal
information. "[E]-commerce companies often require physical and
email addresses, phone numbers, zip codes, birthdays, gender
identification, and other miscellaneous information merely to set up
an online account." Many of these disclosures are not necessary to
complete the desired transactions,3 yet most users voluntarily
relinquish their private information without a second thought.4
With all of this information flying about, one wonders what
safeguards are in place to protect the personal privacy of Internet
users. Most large websites have adopted and published some sort of a
privacy policy, whether through a separate hyperlink or embedded in
a "Terms of Use" agreement.5 In the United States, however, there is
no law requiring websites to adopt and post a privacy policy, 6 let alone
2 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004).
3See id. at 559. For example, the popular search engine and email portal Yahoo! requires
each user to disclose his or her full name, gender, birth date, and zip code before
establishing an account. Yahoo! Registration,
https://edit.yahoo.com/registration?.intl=us&new=1&.done=http%3A//mail.yahoocom&.
src=ym (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). It is unclear why Yahoo! would require the gender and
birth date of a potential member simply to set up an email account. Indeed, another
popular email portal, Google, does not require this information at all while providing
essentially the same service. See Google Accounts,
https://www.google.com/accounts/NewAccount?continue=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.
com%2F&hl=en (last visited Mar. 8, 2011).
4See Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 561-62 (arguing that the "just click submit" phenomenon
is largely motivated by electronic consumers' "must, rush, and trust tendencies").
sA 2007 survey of the top twenty-five most visited websites revealed that every one of
those sites posted a privacy policy statement. Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 599. However,
only seventeen of those sites conspicuously posted a policy on the site's homepage. Id. The
remaining 8 sites either posted their policies on a secondary page or posted a link on the
homepage that was difficult to identify. Id.
6 Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 610-11; see also infra Part II.C for a discussion of U.S.
electronic privacy law.
a law requiring websites to adopt certain provisions within a policy.7
While other countries have adopted comprehensive electronic privacy
laws, the United States seems content to let the free market regulate
privacy. In most instances, therefore, website operators need only
follow the privacy protections that they themselves have written and
chosen to adopt. With the fox left guarding the henhouse, one begins
to wonder, quis custodiet ipsos custodes?8
This Article analyzes United States privacy law as it pertains to
electronic transactions (or "e-commerce") and the use of electronically
stored personally identifiable information ("PII"). Unlike many other
countries, the United States does not have a single overarching
electronic privacy law. Many commentators have argued that the U.S.
should adopt a comprehensive set of privacy protections similar to
those adopted in the European Union and Canada. Against that
backdrop, this Article examines the laws of the E.U. and Canada as
alternatives to the U.S. system. Rather than provide yet another
survey of the existing laws,9 however, this Article posits the question,
"Which system of privacy laws is best?"
Of course, if privacy laws operated in a vacuum, that question
would be very easy to answer: the country with the most protections
wins. As with most questions of law and public policy, however, the
answer is not that simple. Speed and convenience are central to the
allure of electronic commerce, and privacy protections may
undermine the ease with which consumers conduct online
transactions.xo Thus, any regime that attempts to tackle electronic
privacy must be careful not to quash the very speed and convenience
that is the lifeblood of e-commerce. The question then becomes,
7 The United States, for example, does not require website operators to adopt a privacy
policy. See infra Part II.B.
8 "Who will watch the watchmen?"
9 There are many excellent sources that summarize the E.U., U.S., and Canadian privacy
law in much greater detail than is afforded here. E.g., Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson,
Privacy Law in the United States, the E.U. and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground,
2 OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357 (2005); Virginia Boyd, Financial Privacy in the United States
and the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization, 24
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 939 (2oo6) (comparing and contrasting U.S. and E.U. privacy laws as
they relate to financial data). This Article provides only a cursory review of these laws in
order to introduce (and justify) a new economic model for analyzing privacy laws in Part
III.
'o Julia M. Fromholz, Data Privacy: The European Union Data Privacy Directive, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 465 (2000).
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"What is the optimal balance between privacy protections and the
efficiency of e-commerce?"
To attempt to answer that question, this Article constructs an
economic model that reflects the relationship between privacy
protections and the speed and convenience of e-commerce. The model
begins by asserting three relatively uncontroversial axioms:
1. People value both privacy and efficiency in e-
commerce."
2. Privacy protections and efficiency are in tension, which
causes a tradeoff between the two.
3. At some point, people will not conduct electronic
transactions if they feel their private information is not
adequately protected.
From these statements, an economic model is constructed to emulate
the relationship between privacy protection laws and the efficiency of
electronic commerce. The model is used to show that consumers
expect a certain basic level of privacy when they conduct electronic
transactions. A government that fails to provide this certain level of
privacy effectively weakens the e-commerce industry. Finally, this
Article argues that the United States has failed to guarantee sufficient
privacy protections and that, by learning from the E.U. and Canada,
the U.S. can increase both personal privacy and the efficiency of e-
commerce by enacting comprehensive electronic privacy laws.
Part I of this Article contextualizes the privacy-efficiency tradeoff
by surveying electronic privacy laws in three governing bodies-the
United States, the European Union, and Canada. Part II constructs a
simple economic framework to model the tradeoff between privacy
and efficiency, and uses the discussion from Part I to map the United
States, the E.U., and Canada's electronic privacy laws onto a privacy-
efficiency "tradeoff frontier." Part II also argues that without a basic
level of privacy protection-a "tradeoff threshold"-some consumers
will reduce the number of transactions they undertake, meaning that
the tradeoff is not absolute. Part III then argues that the United States'
laws currently exist below the "tradeoff threshold," meaning that the
U.S. could increase both privacy and efficiency by enacting
In "Privacy" and "efficiency" are somewhat amorphous terms. Part III specifically defines
these terms as they are used in this paper and the model within it. For now, the general
understanding of each word will suffice.
516 [Vol. -6:3
comprehensive legislation. Finally, Part IV explains why the United
States' current "free market" approach is ill suited for electronic
privacy, and suggests three modest steps the U.S. should take to
increase both privacy protections and the efficiency of electronic
commerce.
I. A (BRIEF) SURVEY OF 21ST CENTURY PRIVACY LAW
In today's global economy, "it is virtually meaningless to talk of
national privacy law."12 Instead, it is best to examine electronic privacy
laws in the context of international transactions. The free exchange of
information is essential to international commerce, and it is not
uncommon for companies to send data across several continents to
complete a single transaction.13 At the same time, individual countries
continue to impose their own rules on data transactions originating
from, or destined to, their jurisdictions-rules that unavoidably extend
to commercial (and often personal) entities in other countries. Thus,
any inquiry into a single country's electronic privacy laws necessarily
involves an examination of how those laws interact with other
governing bodies. As one commentator summarized the situation:
The ubiquity of computers and the growth of networks
have made the collection, analysis, and dissemination
of personal data inexpensive and easy. This growth has
also led to a heightened concern about the level of
protection afforded to personal data. . . . Some
countries seeking to protect the privacy of their
citizens' data have done so in ways that extend the
reach of their data privacy laws into other countries.
Conflict over such reach is virtually inevitable and, if
serious, will likely impede the growth of worldwide
electronic commerce. 14
The following sections compare privacy laws in the E.U., the U.S., and
Canada, with a focus on electronically-stored P11. To facilitate the
comparison, the "lifespan" of electronic information is partitioned into
four categories: collection, use, dissemination, and redress.
12 Boyd, supra note lo, at 939.
13 See id.
14 Fromholz, supra note 11, at 461.
2011]1 SPRAIT 517
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
1. COLLECTION
"Collection" refers to the circumstances under which electronic
entities gather and record P11. Almost all major websites collect P11
both actively and passively.'5 Common concerns raised with the
collection of P11 include notice and consent requirements, "opt in"
versus "opt out" choices, and the level of transparency entities must
adopt.
2. USE
By comparison, "use" considers what things electronic entities can
do with P11 once it is collected. An online entity may use P11 for any
number of reasons, including for internal research, for directed
marketing, or to increase user convenience (for example,
remembering user login information).' 6 Common "use" issues include
how an online entity can process personal information (including
"profile building"), solicitations, and directed marketing.
3. DISSEMINATION
"Dissemination," in contrast with "use," relates to if, when, and
how a collecting entity can share P1I with third parties. The sale of
electronic profiles to marketing companies is a particularly touchy
concern raised within dissemination." Online entities can quickly and
easily generate revenue by selling P11 to third parties, who then use
the information to construct consumer "profiles."'7 The nature of
electronic data makes P11 virtually irretrievable once an entity has
disclosed it to an outside source.' 8
's A 2007 survey revealed that each of the top twenty-five most visited websites collected
user information both actively and passively. Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 601.
16To be sure, many of the ways online entities use P11 appear highly agreeable. For
example, the popular video rental site Netflix.com asks users to rate recently viewed
movies on a scale of 1-5. The site stores a particular user's ratings and looks for other users
with similar tastes. Netflix then recommends additional titles based on the ratings of other
users with similar preferences. Thus, the site's collection and use of PIT allows the company
to distinguish itself from traditional "walk in" video stores by offering customized
recommendations specifically tailored from a given user's preference profile.





Finally, "redress" captures the available remedies (if any) a
governing entity affords consumers. A remedy might be a right to
pursue a private action against a privacy violator, the right to file a
complaint with an administrative body, or the right to access and
correct any stored P11. The availability of redress protects privacy by
allowing consumers to redact false information and by deterring those
who would wrongly collect, use, or disseminate P11.
The following sections analyze the protections afforded by the
E.U., the U.S., and Canada in each of these four stages. Relevant
comparisons between the three governing entities are then drawn. In
the end, the E.U. emerges as the most protective of PII, while the U.S.
affords the least amount of protection. Canada, both federally and
provincially, lies somewhere between the two.
A. THE EUROPEAN UNION
Much of the difference in privacy law between the U.S. and E.U.
can be attributed to the cultural differences between the two entities.19
In most of continental Europe, personal privacy is considered a
fundamental human right,2o similar to the right to free speech in the
United States. To Europeans, the right to control the public
dissemination of private information is a matter of human dignity; the
unwilling disclosure of personal information is both distasteful and
deeply offensive.21 As a consequence, Europeans have placed a greater
19 See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151 (2004). Professor Whitman argues that the current privacy law
in the E.U. and U.S. is the product of cultural differences, which, in turn, are a product of
historical social norms. He states, "Privacy law is not the product of logic ... It is the
product of local social anxieties and local ideals. In the United States those anxieties and
ideals focus . . . around the ambition 'to secure the blessings of liberty,' while on the
Continent they focus on the ambition to guarantee ... everyone's 'honor."' Id. at 1219-20.
20 Fromholz, supra note 11, at 462. Indeed, Directive 95/46/EC repeatedly refers to the
right to privacy as one of the "fundamental rights and freedoms" held by all people. E.g.,
Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L281) 31, Preamble (2), (10), (11).
21 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1192-94. Professor Whitman does not argue that Europeans
are hermetical by nature (that is, that Europeans are necessarily resistant to public life).
Rather, Professor Whitman claims Europeans expect a certain degree of control over the
public dissemination of their private affairs. He illustrates this point using a particularly
revealing (excuse the pun) example: public nudity. In many regions in Europe, it is
common to see a fully nude person sunbathing in a public park. While a nude sunbather
has clearly consented to public viewing of his or her body, it would be considered a
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emphasis on protecting the individual's "dignity," through greater
restrictions on electronic data, than on protecting the efficiency of e-
commerce.2 2 Consistent with this view, the European Union has
adopted regulations that significantly restrict how entities can collect,
use, and disseminate electronically stored PII.
1. DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC23
In 1995, the European Commission enacted a comprehensive
directive designed to "harmonize data privacy laws among the fifteen
member states" by setting a "minimum level of [privacy] protection"
by which all member states were to abide.24 The legislation, commonly
referred to as the "Data Privacy Directive," explicitly balances the need
to "mak[e] the processing and exchange of such data considerably
easier" among member states, with the need to "respect [the]
fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy," of
individual people.25 The Directive accomplishes these objectives by
significantly limiting the collection, use, and dissemination of PII. The
Directive also creates several avenues of redress available to P1I
subjects whose privacy has been violated.
a. COLLECTION
With very few exceptions, the Data Privacy Directive prohibits the
collection of PII from any user who has not "unambiguously given his
violation of personal privacy if a photographer were to capture and disseminate images of
the publicly nude person. "The difference," Professor Whitman explains, "is not that
Europeans refuse to be seen nude, but that they insist that they want to be the ones who
should determine when and under what circumstances they will be seen nude." Id. at 1201
(emphasis added). To most Europeans, involuntary public dissemination of one's nude
image would violate the right to control one's public life, even if that image was captured in
a decidedly public setting. Id.
22 See id., at 1192.
23 Council Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter "Directive
95/46/EC," or "Data Privacy Directive"].
24Fromholz, supra note 11, at 468.
25 Directive 95/46/EC, at Preamble (2), (4).
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consent" to the collection.26 The Directive defines "consent" as "anyfreely given specic and informed indication of [a data subject's]
wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal
data relating to him being processed."27
Against this strong language, the Directive enumerates limited
exceptions to the consent requirement. For example, an entity may
collect PII without a data subject's consent if collection is "necessary
for compliance with a legal obligation"28 or for "performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party."29 Additionally, the
Directive contains exemptions pertaining to national security,30
"legitimate" government interests,31 or when necessary "to protect the
vital interests of the data subject."3
b. USE
The Data Privacy Directive broadly defines "processing of personal
data" to mean any action involving the "collection, recording,
organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation,
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, . . . [or] erasure or destruction" of PJJ.33 Thus, the
restrictions that apply to the collection of P11 also apply to use and
dissemination.34 Most notably, online entities must obtain
"unambiguous consent" before they "use" PI.
The Directive restricts the use of P11 in other ways. For example,
all data involving personally identifiable information must be
26 Id. at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (a).
27Id. at ch. I, art. 2, cl. (h) (emphasis added).
28 Id. at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (c).
29 Id. at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (b).
301d. at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (e).
31 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (f).
32 Id. at ch. II, § II, art. 7, cl. (d).
33 Id. at ch. I, art. 2, cl. (b).
34The "unambiguous consent" language in chapter II, section II, article 7 applies to all
"processing of personal data," a term that, as shown above, applies to use as well as
dissemination.
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processed "fairly and lawfully."35 Once P11 is collected, online entities
can only use the data in ways that are compatible with the "specified,
explicit and legitimate purposes" for which the information was
originally collected.36 Finally, the Directive calls on member states to
"implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to
protect personal data against . . . loss, alteration, unauthorized
disclosure or access."37 Online entities operating within a member
state must then abide by the state's "technical and organizational
measures" if the entity wishes to use PII.
c. DISSEMINATION
The Directive's restrictions on third-party transfers are perhaps
the most restrictive in the world, and pose a significant threat to
international transactions. 8 Within the member states, an entity may
not transfer PII to another entity without the informed, unambiguous
consent of a data subject.39 This restriction comports with the
Directive's other limits on collection and use. However, it is the
restriction on data transfers outside of the E.U. that raises serious
concerns.
Article 25 prohibits "the transfer to a third country of personal
data" except where "the third country in question ensures an adequate
level of protection."40 The Directive leaves the phrase "adequate level
of protection" notably undefined,41 offering as guidance only that
"[t]he adequacy of the level of protection afforded by a third country
shall be assessed in the light of all the circumstances."42 While the
exact contours of "adequate protection" remain unclear, what is clear
35 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. II, § I, art. 6, cl. i(a).
36 Id. at ch. II, § I, art. 6, cl. i(b).
37 Id. at ch. II, § VIII, art. 17, cl. 1.
38See Fromholz, supra note 11, at 474.
39 See Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. I, art. 2, ci. (b), (h), & ch. II § II, art. 7, ci.
(a).
40 Id. at ch. IV, art. 25, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
4'Fromholz, supra note 11, at 469.
42 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. IV, art. 25, cl. 2.
[Vol. -6:3522
is that many of the world's countries-including the U.S.-do not pass
the test.43
The practical impact of this provision cannot be overstated.
"Without a resolution the stand-off [between the E.U. and non-
compliant third countries] could result in an extreme hindrance to
global trade."44 The free flow of information is critical to commerce,
and the Directive places a significant restriction on that flow. As one
commentator noted, "strictly implemented, the Directive could
prohibit [even] mundane transactions such as the transfer of data
from the European subsidiary of a multinational company to its
American headquarters."45
There are a few provisions that lessen the Directive's otherwise
draconian restrictions on data transfers and soften the potential effect
on international commerce. A third country may, for example,
negotiate an agreement with the Council whereby the Council
uniformly declares the country "safe" for data transfers. 46 The
Directive also outlines limited exceptions in which personal data may
be sent from the E.U. to an "inadequate" third country,47 such as when
the transfer is needed to satisfy a legal obligation48 or to protect an
"important public interest."49 Outside of these limited situations,
however, data processing entities in the E.U. cannot transfer PII data
to any third country that does not meet the Council's definition of
"adequate protection."
43 Boyd, supra note 10, at 940. Ms. Boyd notes that although "[v]arying degrees of privacy
legislation exist in different sectors of the U.S. economy ... the European Union has not
found that the overall level of protection in the United States meets the European
standards." Id.
44 Kevin Bloss, Note, Raising or Razing the e-Curtain?: The E.U. Directive on the
Protection ofPersonal Data, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 645, 646 (2000).
45 Fromholz, supra note 11, at 474.
46 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. IV, art. 25, cl. 6.
47 For a full list of exceptions, see id. at ch. IV, art. 26.
48Id. at ch. IV, art. 26, cl. 1 (b), 1 (d).
49Id. at ch. IV, art. 26, cI.1 (d).
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d. REDRESS
The Data Privacy Directive provides several avenues of relief for a
person whose P11 has been mishandled. First, Article 22 requires that
"Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a judicial
remedy for any breach of the rights guaranteed him."so Second,
Article 23 provides that "any person who has suffered damage as a
result of an unlawful processing operation . . . is entitled to receive
compensation from the controller5' for the damage suffered."52
Third, the Directive endows data subjects with a broad right to
access their PH once it has been collected and stored. Article 12 grants
a data subject the right to know "whether or not data relating to him
are being processed," the purpose behind any such processing, and
full disclosure of the recipients of the processed data (if any).53 Finally,
data subjects have the right to correct any false information pertaining
to their P1I and the right to block or destroy any stored data that was
collected, used, or disseminated in violation of the Directive.54
B. THE UNITED STATES
Unlike the European Union, the United States does not have "a
single, overarching privacy law."ss Instead, the United States employs
a scattered system of threat- and industry-specific protections aimed
at curbing particularized threats to privacy.56 Commentators have
described this system (in varying degrees of disparagement) as
"reactive, "57 "disjointed and piecemeal,"s8 "a patchwork quilt,"59 and,
5Id.at ch. III, art. 22.
51 The "controller" is the entity charged with "[determining] the purposes and means of the
processing of personal data." Id. at ch. I, art. 2, cl. (d). Effectively, the controller acts as a
government agency that specifies if and how an entity can process PII.
52 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at ch. III, art. 23, cl. 1.
53 Id. at ch. II, § V, art. 12, cl. (a).
54 Id. at ch. II, § V, art. 12, cl. (b).
ss Fromholz, supra note ii, at 471.
56 For a brief and comprehensive summary of federal privacy laws in the United States, see
Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10.
57Id.
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perhaps most illustratively, as "a sectoral 'skyline,' with skyscrapers
(high regulation) in some areas.. . and tenements (lower regulation)
in others." 60
This oblique approach to privacy protections can be at least partly
attributed to how Americans view privacy itself Unlike the E.U., 61
"[t]he United States and its companies refuse to acknowledge personal
data privacy as a fundamental human right."62 Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution "does not explicitly mention any right of privacy" in its
articles or amendments. 63 ThiS is not to say that Americans live
completely unprotected from personal intrusions. The U.S. Supreme
Court has long recognized an implied right of privacy in the word




6OBoyd, supra note 1o, at 941.
61The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
expressly recognizes privacy as a fundamental human right. Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/o/EnglishAnglais.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). The Data Privacy
Directive incorporates by reference this right to privacy. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note
24, at Preamble (i).
62 Bloss, supra note 45, at 650.
63 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151 (1973) (emphasis added).
64 Id. ("In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as [1891], the Court has
recognized that a right of personal privacy ... does exist under the Constitution."). The
Court has stopped short of providing an exhaustive (or even illustrative) list of privacy
rights protected within "liberty." The Court has only identified specific instances where
"liberty" protects a narrowly specified right. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(interracial marriage); Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (terminate pregnancy
through abortion); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (same-sex sodomy). As
Lawrence and Casey attest, the implicit recognition of rights protected by the word
"liberty" has resulted in some of the most contentious decisions in the U.S. Supreme
Court's long history. In addition to arguments over the right to consensual same-sex
sodomy (Lawrence) and the termination of pregnancy through abortion (Casey), the
debate over what substantive rights are protected by "liberty" has caused the Supreme
Court considerable embarrassment and has sparked a prolonged and divisive debate over
the role of the courts in our tri-partite system of governance. See Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905). The Supreme Court's post-Lochrner reluctance to read new substantive
rights into the word "liberty," such as a right to electronic privacy, is perhaps another
argument in favor of uniform federal legislation (although one that far exceeds the scope of
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The indirect constitutional protection is not the only reason
electronic privacy laws in the U.S. have lagged behind the E.U.
Traditionally, Americans have been most fearful of government
intrusions into their personal affairs, not of corporate invasions. 66
Americans seem to treat their privacy in the commercial world "as
akin to personal property ... it may be bargained and exchanged for
other rights and privileges," 67 including certain commercial benefits.
America's deeply entrenched Orwellian fear of "Big Brother,"68
however, has produced a batch of relatively strict privacy laws that
apply exclusively to government actors. Meanwhile, the private sector
has remained largely unregulated.
For example, the Privacy Act of 197469 limits the federal
government's ability to collect, retain, and process personal
information, 70 and provides individual citizens with a right to review
and have their records corrected.7' The restrictions imposed by this act
are similar in nature to the restrictions imposed by the E.U.'s Data
Privacy Directive.72 However, unlike the E.U.'s Directive, the
protections in the Privacy Act of 1974 only apply to federal
government agencies-not to private companies.
this paper). For an example of an argument in this vein, see Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video
Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2004).
65 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. The indirect and implied acknowledgement of a right to
privacy (as opposed to the European Union's express recognition of privacy as a human
right) provides an interesting insight into the differences in how the two governing entities
treat the collection, use, and dissemination of PII.
66 See Whitman, supra note 1, at 1161-63; see also Levin & Nicholson, supra note lo, at
359.
67Gail Lasprogata et al., Regulation of Electronic Employee Monitoring: Identifying
Fundamental Principle of Employee Privacy through a Comparative Study of Data
Privacy Legislation in the European Union, United States and Canada, 2004 STAN. TECH.
L. REv. 4, 6(2004).
68 "It is the rare privacy advocate who resists citing Orwell when describing these dangers."
Whitman, supra note 1, at 1153.
695 U.S.C. § 552a.
70 Id § 552a(b), (e-f).
7 §d  552a(d).
72 See supra, Part II.A.
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There are several other statutes in the U.S. that protect against
unwarranted government intrusion into personal privacy, statutes
that, by definition, do not apply to private actors.73 These statutes
generally protect against unwarranted "search and seizure" in
electronic fora.74 Fear of government surveillance, however, does not
appear to significantly affect the scale or scope of e-commerce. Thus,
these statutes are largely irrelevant for purposes of this Article, and
they are not discussed in any detail.
Because the United States does not operate under a single, unified
privacy law, it is difficult to examine the U.S. using the "collection,
use, dissemination, and redress" framework. Instead, the following
subsections analyze the various industry-specific laws in the U.S.
Consistent with the scope of this Article, only those laws that
significantly affect some area of e-commerce and electronic privacy
are discussed. Other legislation, while relevant to American privacy
law in general, is not discussed here.75
1. THE FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION ACT (A.K.A. GRAMM-LEACH
BLILEY ACT)76
The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) is one of the most important
(and restrictive) privacy laws in the United States. The GLBA applies
to the use of PII by banks and other financial institutions.7 The Act
requires financial institutions to adopt a privacy policy that explains
how the institution collects, uses, and disseminates PII.78 While the
73E.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986)
(restricting warrantless electronic surveillance during criminal investigation); The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1974) (limiting disclosure
of student information by federally-funded schools); The Driver's Privacy Protection Act,
18 U.S.C. 2721 (1994) (restricting disclosure of private information by state motor vehicle
offices).
74See The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, supra note 74; FERPA, supra
note 74; The Drier's Privacy Protection Act, supra note 74.
75 For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
regulates the use of personal health information by health professionals. The law does not
appear to have a significant impact on electronic commerce outside of intra-health care
entity recordkeeping. Accordingly, it is not discussed here.
76 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (1999).
77See id.
78See id. § 6803.
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Act requires the adoption of such a policy, it does not stipulate what
terms are to be included within the policy. Thus, the Act "fails to set
any principles for those policies."79
2. THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT (FCRA)80
Like the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, the FCRA applies only to
financial institutions that hold or process PII. The Act is "primarily
concerned with ensuring [the] credit accuracy" of consumer credit
reports.81 Credit reporting agencies are required to report accurate
credit information and to timely correct any false information relating
to an individual's credit history. The Act also recognizes consumers'
right to access and request correction of any information contained in
the consumer's credit report. This right of access and correction is
similar to that guaranteed in the E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive. Unlike
the Directive, however, the FCRA only applies to information included
in individual credit reports.
3. THE IDENTITY THEFT AND ASSUMPTION DETERRENCE ACT82
This Act, administered by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
does not provide any specific protective measures for electronically
stored P11. The Act's principal effect is to criminalize (and thereby
deter) identity theft activity. While the Act does not afford any specific
rights to consumers or impose any obligations on commercial entities,
it does empower law enforcement officers to arrest and punish those
who seek to criminally exploit PII.
79Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10, at 365.
8015 U.S.C. § 1681.
81 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10, at 364.
8218 U.S.C. § 1028.
528 [Vol. 6:3
4. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 199683 AND THE CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT84
These two laws, taken together, impose restrictions on the
collection and use of PII by entities operating within the
telecommunications and cable television industries. Both laws
prohibit the collection of PI1 that is not necessary to perform the
relevant contractual service. Any additional collection or use of PII is
only allowed in light of the data subject's express consent. In this way,
the two laws mirror the notion of "consent before collection" found in
both the E.U. and Canada (see below). However, unlike the E.U.'s and
Canada's broad legislation, these laws only apply to entities operating
within strictly defined industries-another example "of the American
piecemeal approach to privacy of personal information."85
5. THE CHILDREN'S ON-LINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1998
(COPPA) 86
COPPA was passed "to protect children's personal information
from collection and misuse by commercial websites." 87 Prior to
COPPA, it was not uncommon for children's websites to solicit
demographical information from minors in exchange for access to
online games or content. Congress leapt at the chance to end these
unscrupulous practices,88 and it imposed strict limits on online
entities directed at children under the age of thirteen. Specifically,
COPPA requires websites soliciting information from minors to
"provide parents with notice of their information practices and to
obtain parental consent prior to the collection." 89
83 47 U.S.C. § 151.
8447 U.S.C. § 551.
85 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 1o, at 365.
8615 U.S.C. § 6501.
871d. at 367.
88What politician wouldn't want to report to his or her constituents that he or she was
responsible for legislation aimed at ending the commercial manipulation of children?
89 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 1o, at 367.
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Like most of the U.S.'s privacy legislation, COPPA is limited in
scope: the Act only applies to the collection of PII from children under
the age of thirteen.90 Even then, the law only imposes consent and
parental notice requirements.9' As all of these laws illustrate, the
United States has simply failed to mandate broadly applicable uniform
standards for the collection, use, and dissemination of electronically
stored PII.
C. CANADA
In terms of electronic privacy, "Canadians occupy the middle
ground between the E.U. and the U.S., sharing American concerns
about 'Big Brother' government, while also having deep concerns
about private sector abuse of their personal information."92 The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not explicitly
recognize a right to personal privacy,93 just as the U.S. Constitution
does not. Similar to the E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive, however,
Canada's national government has implemented widely applicable
legislation that restricts the collection, use, and dissemination of
electronically stored PII.94
Canada's Federal Privacy Commissioner summarized the country's
view of privacy as "the right to control access to one's person and
information about one's self The right of privacy means that the
individuals get to decide what and how much information to give up,
to whom it is given, and for what uses."95 Thus, Canadians see
electronic privacy not necessarily as a fundamental freedom, but as a
right to choose what PII to reveal and to whom.96 The following




92 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 1o, at 360.
93Lasprogata et al., supra note 68, at 6.
94 See id. at 8.
95Levin & Nicholson, supra note 1o, at 392, quoting Privacy Commission of Canada,
Speech at the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Conference (June 13,
2002).
96See id. at 392-93.
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1. PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENTS ACT (PIPEDA)97
PIPEDA imposes significant restrictions on the collection, use, and
dissemination of PII in the private sector. The Canadian national
government fully implemented98 PIPEDA in 2004 with two goals in
mind. First, the law was viewed as a "'key lever' in establishing trust
and confidence with respect to electronic commerce."99 Canada
recognized early on the need to assure basic levels of privacy in order
to facilitate and grow electronic commerce, a point addressed later in
this Article.100
Second, the Canadian government passed PIPEDA in direct
response to the E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive.' Canada viewed
PIPEDA as essential to guarantee that it met the "adequate"
protections required by the Privacy Directive, thereby "[preserving]
very important trade relations with the E.U."102 Accordingly,
PIPEDA's restrictions reflect those in the Privacy Directive (although
somewhat less severely) in terms of how private entities can collect,
use, and disseminate electronically stored PII.
a. COLLECTION
Under PIPEDA, an organization may only collect PII with the data
subject's "knowledge or consent."103 This language suggests Canadian
entities can collect P1I if the data subject is aware of the collection but
has not necessarily consented to the collection. This "either or"
provision allows entities to establish "opt out" systems, where PII is
97 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA), R.S.C., ch. 5
(2000) (Can.).
98 The law was originally passed in 2000, and gradually phased-in from 2001 until it was
fully implemented in 2004.
99 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10, at 379.
1o See infra Part III.
101 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 1o, at 379.
102Id. This effort appears to have succeeded. The E.U. now considers it "safe" to transfer
electronically stored PII to Canada.
103 PIPEDA, supra note 90, § 7 (emphasis added).
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collected unless a user affirmatively elects out of collection. In
contrast, the Data Privacy Directive's "unambiguous consent"
requirement effectively requires entities to obtain "opt in" consent
before they can collect PII. Thus, the Canadian system is more flexible
and facilitative of market-based choices than the E.U.'s strict
requirements.
PIPEDA also enumerates exceptions to the consent requirement,
just as the Data Privacy Directive does. Approved exceptions include
situations where collection is "clearly in the interest of the individual
and consent cannot be obtained,"1o4 when "the information is publicly
available,"105 or when furthering an investigation into "a contravention
of the laws."o 6
b. USE
Similar to collecting PII, entities may only use PII with the data
subject's "knowledge or consent." PIPEDA also restricts the use of PIT
to purposes for which the data was originally collected, and it limits
the ability to keep and store PII to "only as long as necessary to fulfill
the purpose for which it was collected."07 These provisions limit the
accumulation of massive amounts of PII in commercial databases,
which effectively reduces the chance that a "hacker" or data thief
might improperly access and misuse electronically stored PII.
Notably, PIPEDA does not place any sort of restrictions as to how
an entity uses P11. The law does not, for example, prohibit data-
collecting entities from aggregating PII for internal research purposes,
or from directing advertisements to PII subjects' home or electronic
addresses. Collecting entities are free to make reasonable use of PII,
consistent with commercial practices, so long as PII subjects are
aware of or have consented to the use. In this way, PIPEDA does not
unduly interfere with electronic commerce, and it avoids some of the
market distortions that broadly applicable privacy laws might
inadvertently produce. Thus, PIPEDA is a fine example of how privacy
laws can interact in parallel with a free market system without unduly
infringing on marketplace efficiency.
104See id. § 7(1)(a).
lo5See id. § 7(1)(d).
'o
6 See id. § 7(1)(b).




PIPEDA broadly prohibits the disclosure of "personal information
without the knowledge or consent of the individual."os Similar to the
E.U.'s Privacy Directive, PIPEDA provides a list of enumerated
exceptions to the "knowledge or consent" requirement. Examples of
these exceptions include situations where dissemination is "required
to comply with a subpoena or warrant,"o9 when there exists "an
emergency that threatens the life, health or security of an
individual,"11o or where otherwise "required by law."111
PIPEDA also permits disclosure of PII to certain government
entities, much like the Data Privacy Directive. Unlike the Directive,
however, PIPEDA does not provide a blanket exception to all
government agents for any and all purposes. Instead, PIPEDA
specifically enumerates the situations under which a commercial
entity can disclose P11 to a government source. An entity may disclose
PII to a government institution, for example, only when the institution
"suspects that the information relates to national security, the defence
[sic] of Canada," or if the information is needed for "enforcing" or
"administering any law of Canada."112
Here, again, PIPEDA appears to occupy the middle ground
between the E.U. and the U.S. PIPEDA seems to reflect a distrust of
government similar to that held by Americans. Rather than allow PII
disclosure whenever necessary to pursue a legitimate government
interest, Canada has specifically restricted government use of
commercially collected PII. This compromise approach-expressly
limiting the government's use of P11 while acknowledging some
exceptions-would likely be more palatable to most Americans than
the E.U. approach. Thus, PIPEDA again serves as a fine example of
how the U.S. could enact broad privacy legislation without issuing the
carte blanche to government surveillance that Americans fear so
dearly.
io8 PIPEDA, supra note 90, § 7(3)-
109 See id. § 7(3)(c).
loSee id. § 7(3)(e).
... See id. § 7(3)(i).
112 See id. § 7(3)(c.1).
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d. REDRESS
PIPEDA offers a strong enforcement provision for privacy
violations. Canada employs a Federal Privacy Commissioner charged
with ensuring compliance with privacy laws and monitoring any
violations.113 Rather than rely solely on government oversight,
however, PIPEDA provides a mechanism by which aggrieved private
parties themselves can seek recourse for alleged privacy violations.
PIPEDA balances this private remedy with agency oversight in order
to limit excessive (and possibly frivolous) lawsuits.
To bring a claim under PIPEDA, a private party files a complaint
with the Privacy Commissioner, alleging some violation of PIPEDA.
The Commissioner conducts an initial investigation into the
complaint, during which time the Commissioner may hold evidentiary
hearings or compel relevant parties to produce "any records and
things that the Commissioner considers necessary."114 The
Commissioner then files a report (due no later than one year from the
date the complaint was filed) that contains any findings,
recommendations, and existing settlements."1s
After receiving the report, the complainant may then "apply to the
Court for a hearing in respect of any matter in respect of which the
complaint was made."1 6 The Court, upon review, might then issue one
of several available remedies. The Court might order the organization
"to correct its practices" or require the organization to publish notice
of any changes the organization voluntarily agreed to make."? Finally,
in the event of a significant privacy violation, a Court may "award
damages to the complainant, including damages for any humiliation
that the complainant has suffered."" 8
113 Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10, at 379.
114 PIPEDA, supra note go, § 12(1)(a).
115 See id. § 13(1). The Commissioner is not required to file a report if the Commissioner
determines the complaint could "more appropriately be dealt with" through the court
system, or if the complaint is found to be "trivial, frivolous or vexatious." Id. § 13(2). This
interesting mechanism likely relieves some of the bureaucratic pressure that might
otherwise impair an agency charged with such a broad task.
16 See id. § 14(1).
1"7See id. § 16(a)-(b).
118 See id. § 16(c).
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This system of enforcement and redress is interesting for two
reasons. First, PIPEDA explicitly empowers a government agency to
track compliance and pursue enforcement actions.119 This ensures
entities will not commit minimally offensive privacy violations that,
although inconvenient or annoying, would not likely spur a private
complaint. Second, PIPEDA allows private parties to hold data-
collecting entities accountable while filtering frivolous claims through
the Commissioner's office. In doing so, PIPEDA capitalizes on the
strength of private parties, who have a strong interest in their own
privacy, while minimizing the likelihood of frivolous litigation
designed to extort settlements from deep-pocketed defendants. This
system seems highly compatible with the U.S.'s approach to private
litigation and government oversight. In fact, it might serve as a model
for improvement in other areas of the law.
D. SUMMARY
Electronic privacy laws vary greatly from one country to another.
When compared to the United States and Canada, the European
Union emerges as the most protective of personal privacy. The Data
Privacy Directive is a bold, affirmative step towards protecting
"personal dignity" in all realms, including electronic commerce. The
United States, by contrast, appears reluctant to engage electronic
privacy concerns head-on. The U.S has yet to enact a single,
comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at protecting electronic
privacy in all sectors of the economy. Instead, the U.S. continues to
rely on a market-based system augmented by occasional (and
irregular) legislation. Canada, as others have argued,120 lies
somewhere between the two. PIPEDA marks a "middle of the road"
attempt to assuage concerns related to electronic privacy while
simultaneously acting to preserve the integrity and efficiency of e-
commerce.121
Much of the variance between the governing entities is likely
attributable to societal norms and traditions. Some cultures
119 Section 15 allows the Commissioner to petition the Court for a hearing even when a
private party has not filed a private complaint. Furthermore, § 18 allows the Commissioner
to audit, "on reasonable notice and at any reasonable time ... the personal information
management practices of an organization if the Commissioner has reasonable grounds to
believe that the organization is contravening [PIPEDA]." Id. § 18(1).
120 E.g., Levin & Nicholson, supra note 10.
121See id. at 379.
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undoubtedly value privacy more (and in different realms) than others.
To say that one country's laws are "better" than another requires
imparting a value judgment on why privacy is important and how
much of it is appropriate. This I am unwilling to do. Instead, the
following sections attempt to capture the interaction of privacy laws
and the "efficiency" of e-commerce in an economic framework. Each
country's position on the "privacy-efficiency tradeoff," a concept
introduced and explained below, is then approximated. Using the
model, I argue that the United States should impose broad privacy
protections in order to increase both the scale and scope of e-
commerce and the level of protection afforded personal privacy.
II. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PRIVACY
A. THE MODEL
This Article proposes a new economic framework for analyzing
privacy laws, with a focus on electronic privacy and "e-commerce." A
fundamental assertion made in this Article (and recognized
elsewherel22) is that there is an inherent tradeoff between the level of
privacy protection afforded to e-consumers and the efficiency of e-
commerce. One of the most appealing qualities of e-commerce is the
ease and convenience with which a consumer can conduct
transactions electronically. "At the most basic level, the Internet
makes information flows essentially free, instantaneous, and
global."123 As a government imposes additional safeguards to protect
consumers from unscrupulous business practices-such as redundant
identity verifications or password entries-the speed and convenience
of electronic commerce suffers.124
At the same time, consumers no doubt demand a certain level of
assurance that their activities conducted electronically, as elsewhere,
are afforded a certain degree of privacy. Without a guarantee of
privacy at some level, it is unlikely consumers would engage in any
electronic transaction. It is fair to assume, for example, that the
explosion of online music purchases through services such as iTunes
would not have occurred if Apple had made available to the general
122 See e.g., Whitman, supra note 1, at 1192-93; Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 562-68;
Fromholz, supra note 11.
123 Swire, supra note 2, at 850-51.
124 See Fromholz, supra note 11, at 465.
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public the names, physical addresses, and purchasing habits of its
customers.
There is a tension between the objectives of privacy and efficiency.
On the one hand, the absolute absence of privacy protections, whether
those protections are regulatory or self-imposed, would significantly
reduce the popularity of electronic transactions. On the other hand, an
overly burdensome and prohibitive set of privacy laws would almost
surely prove too cumbersome for effective e-commerce, and "would
lessen or even remove the convenience aspect from Web-based
transactions."125 As one commentator dramatically summarized, "[t]he
ability to collect PII from e-consumers allows this ever-expanding
economic sector to operate efficiently; serious restrictions on the
ability to collect this information is akin to removing a plant from
sunlight-e-commerce, as it exists today, would inevitably wither and
die."126 Thus, the world of e-commerce and privacy law, like so many
other fields that have consequently suffered the same fate, exhibits a
property that readily lends itself to economic analysis: tradeoffs.
1. DEFINING THE RELEVANT TERMS
Because the terms are somewhat amorphous, it is necessary to
attach a more specific definition to "privacy" and "efficiency." Here,
"privacy" is an index that captures the concerns expressed by e-
consumers and the protections designed to assuage those concerns.12 7
"Privacy" is used as an index to capture relative changes in
protections. Any action (such as a widely applicable law) that
increases protections on electronic PII will increase the "privacy"
index, labeled Pg (where "g" represents a given governing entity, such
as the E.U.). Any action that lessens privacy protections will produce a
decrease in the privacy index.128 Thus, "privacy" is used here as an
125See Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 565.
1261d. at 564.
127 Here, the term "e-consumers" includes both actual and potential customers who might
engage in some sort of electronic transaction involving the exchange of PIT. The transaction
need not be an exchange of goods or service for money. Accessing a bank statement
through a bank's website, for example, would be a "free" electronic transaction involving
the exchange of PII (namely, the consumer's user name and password).
128 This model does not attempt to posit a quantitative cardinal measure of either privacy or
efficiency. Rather, these terms are ordinal, and used only to represent relative changes.
This definition does not affect my argument, however, because I do not attempt to define
an "optimum" level of privacy and efficiency. Rather, I argue that an increase in U.S.
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ordinal term to assign relative position without assigning a fixed
numerical value.
To illustrate: suppose a popular search engine tracks and records
all of the search terms originating from a particular IP address.129
Consumers might be wary of this type of practice, especially if it is
done surreptitiously. In response, a government might require all
search engines to publicly disclose any recording of search terms in a
plainly available "Terms of Use" provision. This government-imposed
protection would result in an increase in "privacy."
The term "efficiency" can similarly be defined. For purposes of this
model, "efficiency" is an index, E,, that measures the scale and scope
of e-commerce in a particular government, g. "Efficiency," as it is used
here, captures both the breadth of electronic transactions and the
number of those transactions in a governing jurisdiction. Importantly,
"efficiency" is not limited to the speed or quickness of electronic
commerce (although that is one factor). Rather, it is the overall
effectiveness of electronic transactions at serving consumer needs,
which in turn is influenced by factors such as speed or quickness.
Any action that promotes the broader use of electronic
transactions-say, by opening up new markets to viable Internet
commerce-is defined to increase the scope (and thus the efficiency)
of e-commerce. Similarly, any action that increases the total number
of electronic transactions-say, a new technology that makes
authentication more accurate and convenient-will increase the scale
(and therefore the efficiency) of e-commerce.
Finally, the model assumes that consumers value both privacy and
efficiency. Economically, this means consumers derive positive utility
from laws that protect their personal privacy and from the wide
availability of e-commerce. Formally:
(1) Utility = [(Privacy, Efficzency)
where
electronic privacy protections would result in a net increase in both privacy and efficiency.
Because consumers value both privacy and efficiency, an increase in privacy protections
would therefore create an overall net gain in general welfare. Thus, my argument (i.e., that
the U.S. should increase electronic privacy protections) does not require the imposition of
an artificial quantitative structure on either variable. A net gain is a net gain, regardless of
how large or small.
129 Indeed, the three most popular search engines-Google, Yahoo!, and MSN (now Bing)-





Of course, Equations (1)-(3) are not meant to suggest there is not
a point at which consumers feel there is too much privacy (or too
much efficiency); there almost certainly is.130 But this truth merely
reflects the privacy-efficiency tradeoff discussed earlier in this
section. Consumers who feel there is too much "privacy" likely feel
that way because of the impact excessive privacy protections have on
the efficiency of e-commerce, not because they have reached or
exceeded a privacy saturation point. If an increase in privacy did not
result in added inconvenience and delay, then a consumer would
almost certainly desire the additional privacy.
For example, suppose a government required businesses
conducting electronic transactions to call a third party clearinghouse
(such as a credit reporting bureau) to verify the identity of a potential
customer. Such a regulation would delay the speed and increase the
direct cost of an electronic transaction, which some consumers would
find overly burdensome. At first glance, one might suggest these
consumers are suffering from too much electronic privacy. This
conclusion is only half-reasoned, however, and false.
These consumers have likely not reached a "satiation point" of
privacy. Rather, they are merely at a point where they would prefer to
sacrifice some privacy in exchange for additional speed and
convenience in their electronic transactions. These same consumers
would presumably be quite happy with the additional privacy
safeguards if there were not a corresponding change in the cost and
convenience of e-commerce. The consumers in this example do not
suffer from "too much privacy" in the absolute sense; they suffer from
too much privacy in the marginal sense. They would simply prefer to
trade some privacy for increased speed and/or efficiency. Thus,
Equations (2) and (3) are consistent with both consumer perceptions
and the consumer utility axioms of standard microeconomic theory.131
13o See Fromholz, supra note 11, at 465 ("[A] system that unthinkingly elevates privacy
above other interests will give insufficient regard to the costs privacy imposes on the very
people it is intended to benefit").
1Se generally HAL VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH (5th
ed. 1999) (summarizing the axioms of consumer utility theory, including consistency,
rafionality, transitivity, and non-satiation).
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2. THE PRIVACY-EFFICIENCY FRONTIER
As argued earlier,132 there exists a fundamental tradeoff between
privacy protections and the efficiency of electronic transactions.
Loosely speaking, that tradeoff can be represented mathematically,
where the efficiency of electronic commerce is a function of the level
of privacy protections.133 Formulaically, this relationship can be
represented as:




Graphically, this relationship can be represented as a Privacy-
Efficiency Frontier ("PEF"):134
132Supra Part III.
l33Again, I am not the first to identify the privacy-efficiency tradeoff. Numerous articles
have previously identified and discussed this relationship, at least in the abstract sense. See
e.g., Ciocchetti supra note 3, at 562-68; Fromholz, supra note ii, at 465.
134 Figure 1 somewhat incorrectly represents the relationship in Equations (4) and (5).
Figure 1 portrays "efficiency" as the independent variable and "privacy" as the dependent.
This implies changes in e-commerce "efficiency" cause changes in privacy protections. This
representation is almost surely backwards. As Equations (4) and (5) correctly show, it is far
more likely that changes in privacy protections cause changes in efficiency.
Notwithstanding, Figure 1 is more visually intuitive, especially when the "tradeoff
threshold" is introduced in the next section. This situation is not unlike that posed by John






Figure 1: The Privacy-Efficiency Frontier
Note that the PEF models the same tradeoff between privacy and
efficiency discussed earlier: for every increase in privacy protections,
there will be a decrease in overall efficiency. Likewise, every decrease
in privacy measures would increase the efficiency of e-commerce. This
relationship, embodied in Equation (5), is intuitive for almost all of
the Privacy-Efficiency Frontier. Almost.
III. THE TRADEOFF THRESHOLD
Until now, this Article has proceeded from the relatively
uncontroversial notion that consumers value both privacy and
efficiency in e-commerce, and that there exists a fundamental tradeoff
between the two. This section adds a wrinkle to the model. The
argument is this: people require a certain base level of privacy before
they will engage in electronic transactions. If consumers are not
confident their personal information is being protected at some basic
level, they might not engage in any e-commerce. At some point, the
privacy-efficiency tradeoff folds in on itself, and a decrease in privacy
protections will lead to a decrease in the efficiency of e-commerce.
Suppose a government prohibited all online entities from retaining
any user-provided PII. Email service providers and social networking
sites, like Gmail and Facebook, would not be allowed to "save" login
and password information. Retailers such as Amazon and iTunes
would require customers to manually re-enter shipping, payment, and
contact information for each individual transaction. As a result,
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electronic transactions would be slower and more frustrating, leading
some consumers away from e-commerce and back to "traditional"
transactions. By eliminating this privacy law, a government would
likely expand the scale and scope of electronic transactions (thereby
increasing the "efficiency" of e-commerce, as I have defined the
term35). This action-reaction is entirely consistent with the privacy-
efficiency tradeoff captured in Equation (5) and Figure 1.
Suppose, however, the same government eliminated a rule that
required online retailers to encrypt databases used to store individual
credit card numbers. Or suppose a popular website amended its
privacy policy136 to allow for the sale of PII to third-party marketing
companies, who then inundated the data subjects with unwanted
emails, phone calls, and pop-up ads. Both of these actions would
constitute a decrease in personal data privacy, but neither would likely
yield an increase in efficiency. Instead, both of these privacy
reductions would likely lead to a decrease in the amount of e-
commerce, and therefore a decrease in efficiency.137 The argument,
then, is that consumers demand a certain basic level of privacy in
order to conduct electronic transactions. Short of this level,
consumers will not have confidence in the online marketplace, and
will eventually take their business elsewhere.
Here, I define this "basic level of privacy" as the "Tradeoff
Threshold." At any point below the Tradeoff Threshold, a decrease in
privacy protections will lead to an additional decrease in efficiency.
Graphically, this result is represented by a PEF that "folds in" on
itself:
'35 Supra Part III.
136 Many of the most popular websites explicitly reserve the right to amend their privacy
policy without advance notice. Such amendments are almost always binding, as the
consumer's continued use of the site constitutes consent to the new or additional terms.
Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 6o6-o8.
137 Recall that "efficiency" is herein defined as the scale and scope of e-commerce. Thus, any
action that leads to a net decrease in the amount of electronic transactions, or that







Figure 2: Tradeoff Threshold
Note that the majority of the PEF in Figure 2 (the segment located
above the Tradeoff Threshold) correctly reflects the privacy-efficiency
tradeoff captured by Equations (4) and (5). However, the points
located below the Tradeoff Threshold reflect the argument that the
privacy-efficiency tradeoff is not absolute.
Intuitively, this argument is relatively uncontroversial. At some
point, people will not engage in electronic transactions if they feel that
their personal information is not being adequately protected.
Practically, this argument unearths an important policy implication. A
country with electronic privacy laws that are located at some point
below the Tradeoff Threshold is not bound by the privacy-efficiency
tradeoff. A country of this type could increase both privacy protections
and the efficiency of e-commerce by increasing electronic privacy
protection laws.138 Because consumers value both privacy and
138 An analogy may be drawn here to the concept of Pareto optimality. An allocation of
resources is Pareto optimal (or Pareto efficient) if resources cannot be transferred to make
one individual "better off" without making another individual "worse off." If resources can
be reallocated such that at least one person is better positioned and no person suffers any
loss, then the outcome is Pareto sub-optimal, or "Pareto inefficient." See generally ANDREU
MAS-COLELL ET AL, MICROECONoMIC THEORY 312-16 (1995). The analogy here is not exact.
Countries do not "reallocate" units of privacy and efficiency in e-commerce. Nonetheless,
the implications on net welfare and "resource" allocation are similar.
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efficiency in e-commerce,139 strengthening electronic privacy laws in
this situation would yield a net increase in social welfare regardless of
the social or cultural weight a country affords privacy versus
efficiency.
A. So WHAT?
It would be truly difficult to compare the relative success of
privacy laws if the privacy-efficiency tradeoff were constant. Different
cultures are defined by different norms, which in turn create different
sets of laws designed to protect those norms.140 To say that one
governing entity has a "better" set of privacy laws than another would
be to impose the history and culture of one group of people onto an
entirely distinct other. To be sure, the E.U. has adopted a stricter set
of laws that do more to protect personal privacy than either the United
States or Canada. But does that make the E.U.'s system "better" than
its North American counterparts? Almost surely not.
A more plausible argument is that the E.U. system protects privacy
over efficiency because the European people value privacy over
efficiency. As one commentator noted, in Europe "the basic issue is of
course not just one of market efficiency. [European consumers] need
more than credit. They need dignity."141 The E.U.'s strict system may
be optimal given the relative value most Europeans place on privacy (a
lot) and economic efficiency (not much). If the U.S.'s free market
approach similarly matched the value Americans place on privacy (not
much, at least in the commercial sphere) and economic efficiency
(quite a bit), then the U.S. system would be optimal for Americans. If
this were the case, one would have a hard time arguing that U.S. laws
are somehow "inferior" to European laws.
But herein lies the rub: If the United States is below the Tradeoff
Threshold, then a broad increase in electronic privacy protections
would benefit both industry and consumers regardless of how
Americans weigh privacy versus efficiency. If that is the case, then it is
fair-indeed, wise-to take a careful look at how other governments
have addressed electronic privacy. The United States might, for
example, adopt provisions regarding third-party dissemination that
139See Equations (2) and (3), supra Part III.
140 See generally Whitman, supra note 1 (discussing how history and culture have
influenced privacy laws in the U.S. and Continental Europe).
141d. at 1192.
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are similar to the E.U.'s or a system of redress similar to Canada's.
Either one of these actions might yield a net gain in both privacy and
efficiency-if, of course, the U.S. is currently below the Tradeoff
Threshold. The following section argues that it is.
IV. THE CASE FOR GREATER PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Combining the analysis of international law in Part II and the
argument that the U.S. is currently below the Tradeoff Threshold in








Figure 3: Positions on the Frontier
Figure 3 graphically illustrates the relative positions taken by the
U.S., the E.U., and Canada in regard to electronic privacy. As Part I
argued, the E.U. has emerged as the most protective of the three,
while the U.S. offers the least amount of comprehensive protections.
Canada again occupies the middle ground between the two.
The remainder of this Article attempts to justify the argument that
the United States is currently operating below the Tradeoff Threshold.
That is, that an increase in electronic privacy protections in the U.S.
would lead to an increase in both personal privacy and the scale and
scope ("efficiency") of e-commerce. Part JV.B argues that the current
"free market" approach, even when coupled with the patchwork of
state and federal legislation, cannot adequately address the concerns
raised by electronic privacy. Finally, Part IV.C offers several modest
proposals that would push the United States above the Tradeoff
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Threshold by increasing privacy protections without a net loss in the
"efficiency" of e-commerce.
A. THE UNITED STATES IS CURRENTLY BELOW THE TRADEOFF
THRESHOLD
There are at least two arguments suggesting the United States is
currently below the Tradeoff Threshold. First, the E.U. continues to
classify the U.S.'s privacy laws as "inadequate." This determination
forces commercial entities to negotiate specific contracts with
European trading partners, which have high transaction costs.
Second, the American public has grown increasingly weary of how
online entities use PII, a trend that threatens to undermine the
continued growth and viability of electronic commerce.
1. CONFLICTS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EFFECTS ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE
"[T]he European Union has not found that the overall level of
protection in the United States meets European standards."142 The
standoff between the E.U. and U.S. regarding electronic privacy
threatens the continued viability of international commerce.143 A it
stands, U.S. companies are forced to negotiate individual contracts
with European trading partners or to enter into "safe harbor"
agreements. This additional step imposes significant transaction costs
on international dealings, and thereby reduces the attractiveness of
international commerce.
The recent "safe harbor" agreement brokered between the U.S.
and E.U. has done little to assuage the E.U.'s broader concerns. Even
with alternative arrangements, "Europeans still constantly complain
that Americans do not accept the importance of protecting consumer
privacy."144 Given the high value continental Europeans place on
personal privacy,145 it is unlikely the E.U. will budge on its strict
privacy requirements. In the meantime, the continued discrepancy
142 Boyd, supra note 1o, at 940.
143 Boss, supra note 45, at 646.
'44 Whitman, supra note 1, at 1156.
145Supra Part IIA
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between the governing bodies "jeopardizes the aspirations of free
trade."146
2. DOMESTIC RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN E-COMMERCE
Surveys have shown that U.S. consumers are increasingly
unwilling to engage in electronic transactions due to growing concerns
about electronic privacy.147 Much of the reluctance appears to flow
from consumers' perceptions that "companies collecting their P11 are
not doing enough."148 The surveys have at least one lesson to share:
online consumers, whether they act on it or not, desire greater
assurance that their information is being kept safe.
Comprehensive federal legislation would do much to reassure
consumers, arguably in more ways than individual privacy policies
(which few consumers actually read, and even fewer understand49).
Federal legislation would endow consumers with renewed confidence,
especially if the legislation assured consumers of redress for privacy
violations-something a website's privacy policy is unlikely to do.
B. THE FAILURE OF THE FREE MARKET SOLUTION
The United States has thus far deferred electronic privacy to the
free market. Industry leaders have consistently argued that consumers
will dictate the appropriate level of privacy protection.15o If a website
does not adequately protect PII, the argument contends, e-consumers
will stop visiting it. Over time, the offending website will either be
forced to upgrade its privacy protections to "win back" consumer
confidence, or it will be forced to shut down. This argument, indeed, is
the very same market selection argument that has sustained and
perpetuated capitalism as a political-economic ideology for hundreds
of years. Why should it not apply to electronic commerce?
Self-regulation in the Internet Age is inadequate for at least two
reasons. First, the nature of electronic information precludes the "vote
146 Fromholz, supra note 11, at 474, quoting Henry H. Perritt, Jr. and Margaret G. Stewart,
False Alarm?, 51 FED. COM. L.J. 811, 813-14 (1999).
147 See Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 576-77 (summarizing the survey results).
148 Id. at 577.
149Id. at 578.
150 See Fromholz, supra note 11, at 479-84 (summarizing various "self-regulation" efforts).
SPRATI'2011]1 547
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
with your dollar" power of market capitalism because personally
identifiable information, once disclosed, is virtually irretrievable.
Suppose a restaurant rendered particularly bad service to a paying
customer. The customer, while obliged to pay the bill, would not likely
frequent the establishment again. In fact, some customers might make
a concerted effort to warn friends and family about the restaurant's
inferior service. If the restaurant consistently offered a low quality
experience, one would expect it to succumb to its reputation over time
and eventually close.
Consider next the typical electronic transaction. A customer,
usually alone and in the comfort of his or her home, visits a website
seeking some form of a service. The website asks the visitor to submit
some personal information-say, a name, email address, and phone
number-and the customer obliges. The customer finishes the
transaction, closes the browser, and walks away. Suppose the website
subsequently sold the PII it collected to a third party marketing
company, which then used the information to inundate the consumer
with solicitations, "spam" email, and telemarketing. The customer, in
all likelihood, would have no idea why he or she was suddenly
receiving all of the unwanted attention.151 Thus, it would be difficult
for the customer to say, "I'm not going back to that website; they sold
me out!"
Furthermore, even if the user were able to correlate the actions
with the offending website, there is almost nothing the consumer can
do to retrieve the information. When PII "leaves the hand of its
collectors and enters the realm of cyberspace . . . it is virtually
irretrievable."152 The same ease and quickness of information transfers
that makes e-commerce so appealing also makes it extremely
dangerous: "PII is often purchased anonymously and from anywhere
in the world. This information can then be resold multiple times until
it is completely out of the control of the individual it identifies."53
Thus, once a customer has suffered through a bad experience, there is
very little he or she can do about it. While the restaurant guest might
swear never to return and would only lose the cost of the single meal,
151 This is even more likely when there is a significant delay between collection and
dissemination. Most collecting websites aggregate PII into "personality profiles" before
either using it themselves or selling it to third parties. See Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 580.
Given the number of websites visited in an average e-consumer's week, it would be truly
difficult to relate unwanted solicitations back to any one particular site.
152 Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 580.
153Id.
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the electronic consumer will continue to be burdened with unwanted
e-mail and telephone solicitations.154
The second reason self-regulation is inappropriate for electronic
privacy involves the growth of electronic commerce. Consumers who
have suffered through a bad Internet experience (or who know others
who have) will be reluctant to try out new websites. Certain online
entities-such as Google, Amazon.com, or eBay-have established a
solid reputation for protecting sensitive information. These websites
will likely continue to thrive without additional government
regulation.
However, new websites offering new or improved services face a
much tougher battle. Consumers, reluctant to subject themselves to a
bad experience, might shy away from untested websites. This is
especially true if the website is merely an improvement on an existing
idea, and the consumer can complete his or her electronic transaction
at a trusted site. This cautious mentality, coupled with the
irretrievable nature of electronic data, would effectively quash the very
innovation and entrepreneurialism that has and continues to fuel the
technology age. Why risk losing your personal information to
unscrupulous entities when you can go with the "safe bet," even if the
untested website may offer superior service?
New websites, moreover, are not able to effectively combat this
start-up signaling problem. A traditional "brick and mortar" business
entering a market highly dependent on consumer trust would likely
sink hundreds of thousands of dollars into start-up costs to signal
their trustworthiness to potential consumers.155 A new bank, for
example, would likely invest in an expensive new building rather than
a dilapidated office in a strip mall. A rational consumer would view
the up-front investment as a strong signal that the bank is "here to
stay," and not likely to run off with suitcases full of money.
Unfortunately, online entities do not have this option. A website is,
very literally, a series of letters and symbols strung together and
stored on a server. Start-up costs for websites are very low-a fact that
spurred explosive growth and innovation in the 1990's but now
undermines the stability of new operations. And ironically, it is often
154 Many consumers have reacted to the deluge of unwanted email solicitations by
maintaining several email accounts. A consumer might give out one email address to close
friends and relatives, and another, infrequently accessed address to businesses and
distrusted websites.
155 Economists often refer to this strategy as "signaling."
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the least elaborate web pages that consumers consider the best.'s 6
Without the usual presence of signals, therefore, it is difficult for new
entities to establish themselves as responsible stewards of our most
personal information. Together, these failures emphasize the need for
new, comprehensive legislation and underscore the disadvantages of
continued reliance on market forces and self-regulation. It may prove
a tragic irony that those who advocate a market-based approach may
be undermining the very market they seek to protect.
C. WHAT CAN WE Do ABOUT IT?
This section offers a few modest proposals for increasing
electronic privacy in the U.S. Industry leaders would do well to keep in
mind the idea that the U.S. does not need to adopt all or even most of
the provisions in the E.U.'s Data Privacy Directive or Canada's
PIPEDA. Indeed, the differences between these cultures highly advise
against the broad incorporation of any single set of laws.s7
Nonetheless, Americans, as the late movers, have the advantage of
examining what has and has not worked well in other countries. The
following recommendations are merely the foundations upon which
legislators could enact more specific policy provisions.
1. REQUIRE ALL ONLINE ENTITIES TO CLEARLY POST (AND ADHERE TO)
PRIVACY POLICIES
First and foremost, the U.S. should require all online entities to
post privacy policies. This is the least controversial provision, as it
only strengthens the current market-based rationale by bridging the
information gap between consumers and online entities. "From an
information privacy perspective, the biggest problem with the typical
e-commerce transaction is that internet users are not fully cognizant
of what happens to their PII upon submission."15 By requiring
website operators to post conspicuous links to the entity's privacy
policy, the U.S. would at least ensure that consumers are aware of
how their PII is being used. The FTC itself has recognized notice as the
"most fundamental principle" because, "without notice, a consumer
156 Google.com, the world's most popular website as measured by visitors, prides itself on
its Spartan appearance.
'57See supra Parts I & II.
58 Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 560.
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cannot make an informed decision as to whether and to what extent to
disclose personal information."59
2. STRICTLY REGULATE THIRD PARTY DISSEMINATION
Arguably the greatest threat posed by PII disclosure is involuntary
dissemination. It is fair to assume that most consumers are willing to
share their information with an entity that collects it, so long as the
collection is conspicuous and the consumer has chosen to voluntarily
reveal the information to the site. This reflects the consumer's
judgment that the website is trustworthy, which is a finding legislators
should respect.
If "trustworthy" websites are then free to disseminate that
information to other sources, however, the consumer's reasoned
judgment is completely undermined. Consumers, and often data-
distributing entities, simply do not know who is buying the
information and what they are doing with it.160 Industry leaders
certainly have a fair argument when they claim that PII use and
collection is purely voluntary and controlled by the consumer. It most
often is. However, industry leaders appear unwilling to (and likely
cannot) guarantee the safety of any PII disseminated to a third party.
Instead, companies often have "systemic incentives to overuse
personal information where customers have imperfect information
about privacy practices and thus will not find out about abuses."161 By
adopting federal legislation or regulation that restricts dissemination
of PII, the U.S. would undercut this "systemic incentive."
The effectiveness of such regulation hinges, of course, on the
ability to track the distributed information and to punish those who
improperly release it to third parties (something I have argued is
difficult to do). There is, however, at least one cheap and simple
solution: the FTC or other regulating entity could "test" online entities
by creating false information profiles and releasing them to single,
isolated entities. Because the information would only be released to a
single entity, any future dissemination (and subsequent use) of that
information could be traced back to the original entity.
159 FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7 (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf (last visited March 2, 2011).
i6o Ciocchetti, supra note 3, at 580.
16i Boyd, supra note 1o, at 945.
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Suppose, for example, a regulating entity created a fictitious
information profile complete with a new email address
(account_12345@gmail.com) and personal information (age,
occupation, and physical address). The regulator could then use the
information to register for services offered through a target website.
Aside from this initial disclosure, the regulating entity would not
release or reveal the information to any other entity. If the regulator
received any unsolicited emails making use of the profile, the
regulator could investigate the target entity and potentially impose
some form of sanctions. Perhaps the most attractive feature of this
option is its low cost: many providers offer free email registration, and
a single regulatory agent could monitor thousands of "test profiles" at
a time.
This approach is, of course, unlikely to track all improper
dissemination, just as an undercover DEA agent is unlikely to catch all
drug traffickers. Nonetheless, a broad prohibition on improper
dissemination of P11-coupled with an enforcement mechanism, weak
as it may be-would at the least achieve an expressive and deterrent
effect into the market for electronically-stored PII. Furthermore, the
regulating entity could target its efforts toward large websites that
collect significant amounts of P11. And while it may be unlikely that a
new federal law would "scare" all unscrupulous entities into ceasing
all unauthorized distribution of PII, it is even less likely that a single
one of those entities would cease distribution without such a law.
3. NEGOTIATE WITH THE E.U. TO OBTAIN "ADEQUATE" STATUS
The U.S. needs to negotiate some compromise agreement with the
E.U. in order to protect valuable trade interests. The Data Privacy
Directive is not a machine. It was implemented and still is operated by
humans. The U.S. does not necessarily need to comply with every
letter of the Directive. Rather, they simply need to convince the E.U.
that the U.S. affords "adequate" protection. This nebulous definition
leaves plenty of room for negotiation, meaning the U.S. does not
necessarily need to sacrifice its own views and values simply to
comport with the E.U.'s.
As Canada's PIPEDA attests,162 a country need not wholesale
adopt the Data Privacy Directive to achieve "adequate" status.
PIPEDA represents a compromise between the Canadian government
and the E.U. On many levels, the E.U. would surely prefer the United
l2Supra Part II.C.
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States obtain "adequate" status-transaction costs are, after all, built
into the eventual price of a deal, and both parties are affected by that
price. The Canadian experience suggests the E.U. would work with the
United States to form a mutually agreeable covenant that would
provide the assurance and protection the E.U. desires without
completely infringing upon the United States' conception of privacy
and commerce. Just as the Canadian government has integrated its
own views of personal privacy and the value of commercial efficiency
into PIPEDA, the United States, as an extremely valuable ally of the
E.U. (both economically and politically), can surely do the same.
CONCLUSION
The persistent evolution of technology and the growth of e-
commerce will continue to threaten personal privacy. Any rule
structure that seeks to protect electronically stored P11 in the face of
this threat must be careful not to afford "insufficient regard to the
costs privacy imposes on the very people it is intended to benefit." 63
Privacy protections, it has been argued, may come at the expense of
the very speed and convenience that fuel e-commerce. The "optimal
balance" of privacy and efficiency depends greatly on the historical
and social norms of a given people. A system that works well for one
group does not necessarily meet the needs of another.
However, the privacy-efficiency tradeoff is not constant. At some
point, the lack of adequate privacy protection decreases the scale and
scope of e-commerce. Without a basic level of privacy protection,
consumers will be reluctant to engage in electronic transactions for
fear that the online entity will use their information in unwanted
ways. This fear rings especially true with new and untested online
entities, the success of which is key to further innovation and growth
in the industry. A governing entity that finds itself below this basic
level of privacy protection would increase both privacy and efficiency
if it instituted greater privacy protections and thereby increased
consumers' confidence in electronic transactions. This is true
regardless of the relative value a particular society places on privacy
and efficiency.
The United States is one such entity whose privacy protections are
below the basic level. U.S. privacy laws are spotty at best and hinder
electronic commerce at worst. The lack of uniform privacy protections
in the U.S. forces commercial entities to form specific privacy
'
6 3 Fromholz, supra note 11, at 465.
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agreements with European trade partners, which are high in
transaction costs. American companies are also forced to comply with
a patchwork of rapidly changing laws. And most importantly, the lack
of privacy protections threatens to undermine consumer confidence in
electronic transactions and stifle growth in the nation's most
promising new marketplace.
By mandating widely applicable privacy laws that, at a minimum,
require notice and/or consent before collecting PI1, the U.S. would
benefit from a net increase in consumer welfare. In the end,
consumers and commercial entities alike-both foreign and abroad-
would reap the benefits of a reassured marketplace subject to uniform
restrictions and predictable standards. Industry leaders should
abandon their staunch reliance on self-regulation, and instead work
with lawmakers to design a new paradigm of privacy laws that best fits
the wants and needs of the American consumer. "[L]egal protections,"
after all, "play an important role as consumers choose how to conduct
their online transactions. . . . Law, rather than being an enemy of the
market, is a facilitator of it."164
l64Swire, supra note 2, at 86o.
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